No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/02/23: LOC-HAK-108-5-2-4

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

Viron P. Vaky

SUBJECT:

Chile

Attached is an item from the CIB of 7 October which I want especially to call to your attention.

Note particularly the third paragraph. This indicates:

- -- Frei did not pitch in and help the anti-Allende forces;
- -- PDC remains the only possible center of effective political opposition to Allende even though almost irrevocably divided now;
- -- Those parts of the Christian Democrats who are the most anti-Allende interestingly enough include the leaders of the Party's grass roots--labor, peasant, slum-dweller, and women's groups.

These anti-Allende Christian Democrats could form the nucleus of effective opposition if they had some support. Their strength would depend on their "independence." However, we should consider, I think, covert support of these people in a longer range "game-plan" than just October 24. I fear that we will have to begin from scratch and create a somewhat longer range strategy than we had originally thought was necessary.

MORI/CDF C05138552

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

Attachment:

Excerpt fm CIB 7 Oct., page 10

SECRET

CHILE: The swing of most Christian Democrats to Salvador Allende virtually ensures his selection as president in the congressional runoff on 24 October.

On Monday, the majority of the national congress of the governing Christian Democratic Party (PDC) voted to support Allende. The group now in control of the party executive carried through a resolution that requires only "agreement" by Allende to a constitutional reform bill to be worked out with his leftist Popular Unity (UP) coalition. Significantly, most of the 75 Christian Democratic legislators voted for the motion.

Anti-Allende forces in the party tried to hold off a decision on whether to declare support for Allende until a PDC-authored bill containing guarantees of democratic freedoms could be passed by both houses of Congress and accepted formally by Allende. These forces included leaders of the party's grass roots-labor, peasant, slum-dweller, and women's groups. President Frei did not use his prestige to help them, although he opposes Allende. The losers are likely to pay dearly, both politically and personally, for their hard fight. The PDC, Chile's largest party and the only possible center of effective political opposition to Allende, seems irrevocably divided.

Until the eve of the PDC congress, Allende's initial refusal to discuss demands for guarantees had increased pressure within the party against supporting him. The UP's vague agreement on 2 October to negotiate swung the majority of the PDC congress, however. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK-GROUND USE ONLY)

10

SECRET